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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Costin argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record
with a transcript. Mr. Costin argues that the requested transcript is necessary for his
appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the prior proceedings
when it decided to revoke Mr. Costin's probation.

Mr. Costin also argued that the

district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and denied his !.C.R.
35 motion requesting leniency.
In response, the State argues that the requested transcript cannot be added to
the appellate record because it did not exist prior to the probation violation disposition
hearing and, therefore, the district court did not consider it when it revoked probation.
The State also argues that the requested transcript is not relevant to the issues on
appeal because Mr. Costin cannot prove that the district court relied on the information
discussed at that hearing when it revoked Mr. Costin's probation.
This brief is necessary to address the State's characterization of the requested
transcript as new evidence. Mr. Costin argues that the requested transcript is not new
evidence because a district court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings
when it considers whether to reduce a sentence. Since Idaho appellate courts conduct
an independent review of the record when determining whether a district court abused
its discretion in regard to a sentencing/probation determination, what the district court
actually considered is irrelevant. The only questions are: whether the information at
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issue was before the district court, and whether that information is relevant to the issues
on appeal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Costin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Costin due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked probation and executed
the underlying sentence?1

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Costin's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his progress during
2
incarceration?

1

Mr. Costin is withdrawing this issue from this Court's consideration. However,
Mr. Costin incorporates all of the mitigating information contained in Section II of the
Appellants' Brief into Section Ill of the Appellant's Brief.
2
Mr. Costin will rely on the briefing contained in the Appellant's Brief, which addresses
this issue.
3

ARGUMENT
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Costin Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcript

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information, Idaho appellate courts

have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive appellate record
because they conduct an independent review of the entire record before the district
court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in regard to a
sentencing/probation determination.

In other words, the question on appeal generally

does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered.

Instead, the

central question is whether the record before the court supports its sentencing/probation
determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue.

In some instances, appeals have been dismissed due to the appellants'

failure to provide transcripts of hearings which occurred years before the disposition of
the issue on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Costin argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when he requested a transcript necessary to provide an
adequate record for appeal. In response, the State argues that the requested transcript
is not necessary because the district court did not have that transcript when it made the
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determination to deny his I.C.R. 35 motion. The State goes as far as arguing that the
requested transcript would constitute new information on appeal, which cannot be
considered by an appellate court. The State's position, if taken to its logical conclusion,
would limit the information a district court could consider because a transcript of a prior
hearing would have to be created before a district court could consider information from
that hearing in regard to a subsequent proceeding. For example, without a transcript of
a defendant's original sentencing hearing, a district court could not consider information
from that sentencing hearing when determining whether to grant or deny an I.C.R. 35
motion.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Costin Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested
Transcript
An indigent defendant can require the State to pay for an appellate record

including verbatim transcripts of the relevant trial proceedings. However, the State does
not necessarily have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request.

In

order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the
State must provide indigent defendants with a sufficient appellate record to enable a
merit-based review of the issues raised on appeal.

In this case, the Idaho Supreme

Court denied Mr. Costin's requests for a transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on
August 17, 2009. 3

That denial prevents Mr. Costin from adequately addressing the

issue raised on appeal. Further, it could be presumed that the information contained in
the missing transcript supports the district court's decision to deny his I.C.R. 35 motion.

5

In response to this position, the State argues that the requested transcript
pertains to issues over which this Court has no jurisdiction and cannot be considered on
appeal because the "as-yet unprepared transcript was never presented to the district
court in relation to the probation revocation and Rule 35 proceedings at issue in this
case it was never part of the record before the district court and is not properly
considered for the first time on appeal." (Respondent's Brief, pp7-8.) Contrary to the
State's position, the question of whether the transcript of the requested proceeding was
before the district court at the time of its disposition of the I.C.R. 35 motion is not
relevant in deciding whether the transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because
in reaching a sentencing determination, a district court is not limited to considering only
that information offered at the proceeding from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court
is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105
Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are
based, in part, upon what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho
318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of
criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district
and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App.
1984) (approving sentencing

court's reliance upon evidence presented at the

preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could
be expected to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case").

3

The date and nature of the hearing at issue was incorrectly stated in the Appellant's
Brief. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) The State accurately points out that this hearing was an
evidentiary hearing, which was held on August 17, 2009. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.)
6

Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the
district court could rely upon the information it already knew from presiding over the
prior hearings when it denied Mr. Costin's I.C.R. 35 motion.
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide
a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id.
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from an I.C.R. 35 motion. Further, if that is new information, a district
court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at sentencing when
evaluating an I.C.R. 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 452-453
(Ct App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of an appeal
from the denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion because the appellant failed to provide the PSI
and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record.

See also State v.

Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984).
The State's argument is also refuted by State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20
(Ct. App.1992).

In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery and

placed on probation.

Id. at 21.

Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the

district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days.

7

Id.

After completing the period of

retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on probation. Id. Mr. Warren's probation
was then revoked.

Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that his sentence was

excessive. Id. On appeal, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id.
The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the
nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must
look at the nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where
Warren bit off his victim's ear." ld.

4

However, the Court of Appeals did not address the

merits of his sentencing claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a
transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the district court's original
sentence was not directly being appealed, and happened years before the decision at
issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address
Mr. Warren's claims of error.

Moreover, there was no indication that the district court

referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing.
It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would
address the nature of the original offense.

In light of the Court of Appeals' holding in

Warren, had Mr. Costin failed to request the transcript, the State could have argued that
his appeal should have been dismissed for failure to provide an adequate appellate
record. 5

4

This is an example of the Idaho Court of Appeals conducting an independent review of
the record.
5
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, Docket
No 39057, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed the
foregoing argument. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review
articulated in State v. Hanington 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009). Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
8

According to the State, Mr. Costin argued, "with no citation whatsoever," due
process and equal protection require the State to "provide him (and all indigent
defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the state proves 'that
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous."' (Respondent's
Brief, p.10 (quoting Appellant's Brief, p.7) (emphasis in original).

Mr. Costin's burden

shifting argument was based on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971),
where the United States Supreme Court first held that the State does not need to "waste
its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review." However,
the Court went on to hold that:
We emphasize, however, that the State must provide a full verbatim
record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an
appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his
own way. Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State
to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice
for an effective appeal on those grounds. This rationale underlies our
6
statement in Draper, that:
'(T)he State could have endeavored to show that a narrative
statement or only a portion of the transcript would be adequate and
available for appellate consideration of petitioners' contentions. The
trial judge would have complied with * * * the constitutional mandate
***in limitin9 the grant accordingly on the basis of such a showing
by the State.'

time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.

Morgan, at 4 (original emphasis). However, the Morgan opinion is not a final opinion
and Mr. Costin is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.
6
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963).
7
While addressing on the State's argument the Court also noted that:

9

Id. (footnote omitted). If it is apparent on the record that there is a colorable need for

the requested transcripts, it is the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts
are irrelevant. Therefore, Mr. Costin's burden shifting position is supported by the case
law referenced by the State.
Based on the Mayer opinion, the State also argues that Mr. Costin has failed to
make the requisite showing that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on
appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-13.) Specifically, the State cites to the Mayer opinion
for the proposition "that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior
hearings and that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to
revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to a transcription at public expense .... "
(Respondent's Brief, p.9 (original emphasis)).

The State then argues that Mr. Costin

has failed to show that the district court relied on anything that occurred during the
hearings at issue when the district court revoked Mr. Costin's probation. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.9-10.)

The State's position is flawed because it engrafts its definition of

relevance into the holding from Mayer and then confuses the applicable standard or
review. First, Mayer only requires that the State provide an indigent defendant access
to transcripts if they are generally relevant to an issue on appeal. That opinion does not

[This analysis does not include a] balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would
be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available
only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the
sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore,
irrelevant.
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-197.
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attempt to define relevance. It never states that a transcript is relevant if evidence was
adduced at a hearing or if the district court relied on the hearing.
More importantly, the State's position disregards the applicable standard of
review. When a sentencing/probation determination is at issue on appeal, the appellate
court conducts its own independent review of the record, which is not confined to the
information considered by the district court.

State v. Flores, 131 Idaho 285, 286

(Ct. App. 1998) ("Where an appellant asserts that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record and focus
upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender."); State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is
ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)). 8

In

determining whether information is relevant to an appellate court during this review the
only question is whether the information was before the district court, 9 not whether the
district court actually relied on that information. This is plenary review.

Therefore, the

State's assertion that Mr. Costin must prove that the district court relied on information

8

The Hanington opinion was directly addressed by the Court of Appeals in Morgan,
supra, n.5.
9
The information must also relate to a sentencing concern such the nature of the
offense or the defendant's background.
11

which was either discussed or presented at the hearings in question is misplaced
because it disregards the applicable standard of review. 10
Further, the State's position will render appellate review on various issues
meaningless because district courts in Idaho are not required to state their sentencing
rationale.

State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984).

If the State's argument is

accepted, an appellate court would not be able to review a sentence/probation
determination under these circumstances because the court would not know what
information the district court considered. This position it as odds with a system which
purports to provide meaningful sentencing review.
In sum, Idaho courts consider a very broad range of information when making
sentencing decisions. Due to that broad range of discretion, an appellant must provide
an extensive appellate record in order to challenge all forms of sentencing/probation
determinations on appeal because Idaho appellate courts will presume any missing
information will support the district court's decision. It generally does not matter what
the district court actually considered, if the information was in the record and is relevant
to an issue on appeal, an appellate court will review that information.

In light of the

foregoing, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Costin due process and equal
protection when it denied him transcripts of the hearings he will need to overcome this
presumption.

10

Mr. Costin asserts that the Morgan opinion, supra, n.4, is also at odds with the
applicable standard of review.

12

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Costin

respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his sentence.
DATED this 1?1h day of August, 2012.

,/2__

l~

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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